← Jacinta Allan — Full Profile
Jacinta Allan — Findings & Analysis
Australian Labor Party · Bendigo East · State
Premier of Victoria, Minister for Commonwealth-State Relations
The Case Against Jacinta Allan
Executive Summary
Jacinta Allan has served in the Victorian Parliament since 1999 and as Premier since September 2023. As Minister for Transport Infrastructure (2014-2023), she oversaw the $100B+ Big Build program — the largest infrastructure investment in Victorian history. Our investigation reveals a pattern of systemic mismanagement, structural conflicts of interest, and a network of financial relationships that raise serious questions about whether public money has been spent in the public interest.
Key findings: $50B+ in cost overruns on her watch, $150.9B in state debt, a spouse employed by the CFMEU during her oversight of CFMEU-dominated worksites, unsolicited contracts worth billions awarded without competitive tender, and government agencies deliberately structured to avoid public accountability.
The Numbers That Don't Add Up
$50 Billion in Cost Overruns
Every major project Allan oversaw as Transport Infrastructure Minister blew out — not by small margins, but by factors that suggest the original estimates were either incompetent or deliberately understated:
This is not bad luck. This is a pattern. When every single project overseen by one minister blows out by billions, the question is not whether there was mismanagement — it is whether the mismanagement was intentional.
$150.9 Billion in Debt
Victoria's net state debt stands at $150.9B — up from $19B when the Andrews/Allan government took office in 2014. That is a 694% increase. Annual interest payments are $6.8B — $18.6M every single day. Victoria's debt-to-GSP ratio is the highest of any Australian state. Moody's and S&P have downgraded the credit outlook.
Every dollar spent on interest is a dollar not spent on hospitals, schools, police, or services. The interest bill alone exceeds the entire annual budget of several government departments.
The CFMEU Connection — Follow the Spouse
Yorick Piper: The Man at the Centre
Allan's husband Yorick Piper is a former CFMEU official who served during the Big Build construction boom. His career path tells the story:
1. Ministerial advisor in Victorian government (access)
2. CFMEU official during the Big Build boom (profit)
3. Victorian Fisheries Authority Board member while wife is Premier (patronage)
The CFMEU was the dominant construction union on all Big Build projects. The Watson Special Commission estimated CFMEU corruption added approximately 15% to construction costs on major Victorian projects. On a $100B+ program, that implies $15B+ in corruption premium — paid by Victorian taxpayers.
Allan was the minister responsible for the projects. Her husband was an official of the union dominating those projects. This is not an arm's-length relationship. This is a structural conflict of interest at the heart of Victoria's largest ever spending program.
The Circular Flow of Money (Verified AEC Data)
Our analysis of Australian Electoral Commission disclosure data reveals the financial loop:
1. Taxpayers fund Big Build projects ($100B+)
2. CFMEU dominates Big Build worksites
3. CFMEU donates to ALP — $4,067,905 verified total (AEC data, 1998-2015)
4. Peak year: $1,288,000 in 2010-11 alone
5. ALP government approves more Big Build projects
6. Repeat
This is not political engagement. It is a business model where taxpayer money is recycled through union coffers back to the party in power.
The Transurban Deal — No Competitive Tender
An Unsolicited Proposal Worth Billions
The West Gate Tunnel originated as an unsolicited proposal from Transurban — not a government initiative, not a competitive tender, not even a recommendation from Infrastructure Victoria (the government's own independent advisory body, which recommended alternative projects).
Transurban proposed the deal. The government accepted it. In exchange:
VAGO's 2017 report "Managing Unsolicited Proposals" found the assessment process lacked transparency and that the government did not adequately test whether competitive procurement would deliver better value.
The Value Transfer
CityLink generates approximately $800M/year in toll revenue. The concession extension is worth an estimated $5-7B+ to Transurban (discount-rate dependent). Without the extension, CityLink would have become toll-free around 2034. Instead, Victorians will pay tolls for an additional decade — compounding above inflation.
The tunnel itself blew out from $5.5B to $10.2B. Taxpayers bear the overrun. Transurban keeps the guaranteed toll revenue. The Grattan Institute estimated total toll revenue over the extended concession will significantly exceed the cost of building the tunnel.
VAGO and the Parliamentary Budget Office were denied access to the financial model to independently verify value-for-money claims.
Transurban's Political Donations (Verified AEC Data)
While negotiating this deal, Transurban was donating to both parties:
The company that submitted the unsolicited proposal was simultaneously donating to the party that approved it.
The Accountability-Free Agencies
Designed to Avoid Scrutiny
The Big Build delivery agencies (MTIA, SRLA, LXRP, NELP) were established as administrative offices by executive order — NOT as statutory authorities created by legislation. This distinction matters:
This was by design. Gavin Jennings, as Special Minister of State, created these structures specifically to give the responsible minister (Allan) direct control with minimal institutional checks.
Executive Pay
Agency CEOs earn $600K-700K+ — exceeding the Premier's salary of $441K. Total Big Build executive remuneration across all agencies exceeds $50 million per year. Dozens of executives earn over $500K.
The SRL: $35B+ Without a Business Case
The Suburban Rail Loop — potentially Australia's most expensive infrastructure project — was committed without a published full business case, without Infrastructure Australia assessment, and without Infrastructure Victoria assessment. VAGO's 2024 audit was highly critical, finding cost estimates were "unreliable." The Parliamentary Budget Office and independent estimates put the true cost at $100B+.
The China Connection
John Holland Group, a major Big Build contractor, is wholly owned by China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) — a Chinese state-owned enterprise sanctioned by the United States for militarising artificial islands in the South China Sea.
Under Allan's portfolio oversight, this Chinese state-owned subsidiary was awarded major contracts for critical Victorian transport infrastructure. No public disclosure of what security vetting was conducted. A foreign state-owned enterprise has detailed knowledge of Victorian tunnels, rail systems, and transport networks.
The Contractor Donation Network (All Verified AEC Data)
Combined donations from Big Build contractors and the CFMEU to the ALP:
These are the companies that received the contracts. These are the donations they made to the party that awarded them.
Hotel Quarantine — 801 Deaths, Zero Accountability
Allan was one of the most senior cabinet ministers when hotel quarantine was established and failed — leading to Victoria's devastating second wave and 801 deaths. The Coate Board of Inquiry could not determine who made the decision to use private security instead of ADF personnel.
Andrews said he "didn't recall." Only Jenny Mikakos resigned. Allan continued as Transport Infrastructure Minister and later became Premier. Collective cabinet responsibility was simply abandoned.
What This Means
The picture that emerges is not of a single corrupt act, but of a system designed to channel public money to connected interests while minimising accountability:
1. Understated cost estimates secure project approval
2. Unsolicited proposals bypass competitive processes
3. Administrative agencies avoid parliamentary oversight
4. FOI blocking prevents cost transparency
5. Union connections through a spouse provide structural conflicts
6. Donations from contractors to the governing party create a financial loop
7. Executive salaries outside normal PS frameworks reward loyalty
8. Debt burden pushed to future generations who had no say
The infrastructure may have value. The level crossings are removed. The Metro Tunnel is open. But the question is not whether infrastructure was built — it is whether Victorian taxpayers paid billions more than they should have, whether the right projects were chosen for the right reasons, and whether the people making the decisions had conflicts of interest that should have disqualified them from making those decisions.
Sources
All findings in this analysis are drawn from:
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Private Sector Employability Assessment
Survival Rating: 1/10 — Unemployable Without a Rolodex
Jacinta Allan entered Parliament in 1999 at age 26. She has never held a job in the private sector. Not a summer internship. Not a part-time role. Not a single day where her income depended on delivering value to someone who could fire her.
What Would She Put on the Resume?
Who Would Hire Her?
The only organisations that would hire Jacinta Allan are the ones that already operate like government: consulting firms that bill by the hour with no accountability for outcomes, lobbying firms that monetise her political connections, or the boards of companies that rely on government contracts and need someone who knows where the approvals come from.
She would last approximately three months in any role where she had to deliver measurable results to someone who was spending their own money.
The Trust Problem
The private sector runs on trust. Contracts mean something. Budgets are real constraints, not aspirational suggestions. When you tell a client a project will cost $11B and it ends up costing $26B, you don't get to say "the scope evolved" — you get sued.
Allan has spent 27 years in an environment where promises are made to win elections and broken without consequence. That is the opposite of every skill the private sector requires.
Most Likely Post-Politics Career: Board director at a Big Build contractor. The revolving door spins both ways.
CityLink concession extension — $5-7B+ in toll revenue gifted to Transurban
The CityLink toll road concession was extended from ~2034 to ~2045 (approximately 10 extra years). Estimated value to Transurban: $5-7B+ in additional toll revenue (varies by discount rate). The toll escalation formula guarantees tolls rise at the GREATER of CPI or 4.25% per annum — meaning tolls rise FASTER than inflation. At 4.25% compound, tolls approximately double every 17 years. There is NO revenue-sharing mechanism. Transurban keeps ALL upside. If toll revenue exceeds projections, Transurban keeps the surplus. The state bears the downside risk on construction costs. Without the extension, CityLink would have become toll-free ~2034. Instead, Victorians pay tolls for an additional decade, compounding above inflation, with zero public revenue share. Transport economists (Grattan Institute) estimated total toll revenue over the extended concession will SIGNIFICANTLY EXCEED the cost of building the tunnel — the public is paying a substantial premium compared to what public financing would have cost. VAGO and the Parliamentary Budget Office were NOT given full access to the financial model to independently verify value-for-money claims.
Transurban unsolicited proposal — no competitive tender for $10B+ project
Transurban submitted an UNSOLICITED PROPOSAL for the West Gate Tunnel under Victoria's Market-Led Proposals (MLP) framework. The government accepted it WITHOUT competitive tender. No alternative proposals were sought. No independent value-for-money assessment was published. VAGO's 'Managing Unsolicited Proposals' report (2017) found the assessment process LACKED TRANSPARENCY and that the government did not adequately test whether a competitive process would have delivered better value for money. Critically: Infrastructure Victoria — the government's OWN independent advisory body — had NOT recommended the West Gate Tunnel as a priority in its 30-year strategy. It recommended alternative options. Allan was Transport Infrastructure Minister. Pallas approved as Treasurer. The tunnel blew out from $5.5B to $10.2B — and taxpayers bear the overrun risk while Transurban keeps the guaranteed toll revenue. No competitive process = no way to know if this was a good deal for Victorians.
CFMEU donation circular flow — taxpayer money recycled through union to ALP
The circular flow of money: 1. Taxpayers fund Big Build projects ($100B+) 2. CFMEU dominates Big Build worksites (higher wages, dues) 3. CFMEU donates to ALP — $4,067,905 VERIFIED total (AEC data) 4. ALP government approves more Big Build projects 5. Repeat Peak year: $1,288,000 in 2010-11 alone (AEC verified). During this cycle: Yorick Piper was a CFMEU official, Jacinta Allan was Transport Infrastructure Minister overseeing the projects, and the CFMEU was the dominant union on her portfolio worksites. The Watson Special Commission estimated CFMEU corruption added ~15% to construction costs. On $100B+, that's $15B+ in potential corruption premium — all paid by Victorian taxpayers. Meanwhile: Transurban donated $674,675 to ALP (AEC verified), CIMIC/Leighton donated $1,661,418 to ALP (AEC verified). Total from Big Build contractors + CFMEU to ALP: over $6.4M in verified AEC donations. This is not political engagement. This is a business model.
Suburban Rail Loop — $35B+ committed without published business case
The Victorian government committed to the Suburban Rail Loop without: - A published full business case - Assessment by Infrastructure Australia - Assessment by Infrastructure Victoria - A confirmed funding pathway for later stages Cost estimates: $30-50B (government) to $100B+ (Parliamentary Budget Office and independent estimates). VAGO's 2024 audit was HIGHLY CRITICAL — found cost estimates were 'unreliable' and the full business case has never been publicly released. The SRLA is an ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE established by executive order (not legislation), reporting to the Premier (Allan). No statutory accountability requirements. The project was announced before the 2018 election as a political commitment — the business case work followed the announcement, not the other way around. This inverts the normal project assessment process where you assess the project BEFORE committing to it.
Spouse's CFMEU role during Big Build — $100B+ construction program
Yorick Piper served as a CFMEU official during the period when his spouse Jacinta Allan was Minister for Transport Infrastructure (2014-2023), overseeing the $100B+ Big Build program. The CFMEU was the dominant construction union on all Big Build projects. The Watson Special Commission estimated CFMEU corruption added ~15% to construction costs on major Victorian projects. On a $100B+ program, that implies $15B+ in potential corruption premium paid by taxpayers. Allan's dual role — as the minister responsible for the projects AND the spouse of a CFMEU official benefiting from those projects — is the most significant undisclosed structural conflict in Victorian politics.
State debt crisis — $150.9B net debt at 6.5% of GSP
Victoria's net state debt has reached $150.9B under the Andrews/Allan government — the highest debt-to-GSP ratio of any Australian state at ~6.5%. Annual interest payments: $6.8B ($18.6M/day). The debt was primarily driven by Big Build infrastructure spending with massive cost overruns. Moody's downgraded Victoria's credit outlook. The interest bill alone exceeds the entire budget of several government departments. Allan served as Transport Infrastructure Minister (2014-23) overseeing the spending, then inherited the debt as Premier.
Revolving door: advisor → union → government board
Yorick Piper's career path: 1. Victorian Government ministerial advisor 2. CFMEU Victoria official (during the Big Build boom) 3. Victorian Fisheries Authority Board member (while wife is Premier) This trajectory illustrates the revolving door between government, unions, and statutory bodies in Victorian politics. Each role provided access, influence, and income that was enabled by proximity to government decision-making.
West Gate Tunnel PFAS contaminated soil — environment and cost crisis
West Gate Tunnel excavation uncovered PFAS-contaminated soil. Disposal costs spiralled — no adequate plan was in place. Contaminated soil was stockpiled near residential areas. Environmental damage to Maribyrnong River and surrounding waterways. The contamination crisis added hundreds of millions to project costs and caused significant delays. Questions remain about whether adequate environmental assessments were conducted before construction began under Allan's portfolio oversight.
Big Build agencies: $50M+/year executive pay, no statutory oversight
Big Build delivery agencies (MTIA, SRLA, LXRP, NELP) are ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES — not statutory authorities. They were established by executive order, not legislation, deliberately avoiding parliamentary oversight requirements. CEO salaries: $600K-700K+ (exceeding the Premier's $441K salary). Total Big Build executive remuneration across all agencies exceeds $50 million per year. Dozens of executives earn over $500K. These agencies were created by Gavin Jennings' machinery of government design. The structure: - No enabling legislation = less parliamentary scrutiny - Administrative offices avoid statutory reporting requirements - VPS salary caps and recruitment processes bypassed - Direct reporting to minister (Allan), not departmental secretary The PAEC (Public Accounts and Estimates Committee) has raised concerns about the oversight gap. VAGO has repeatedly flagged governance issues.
Fishermans Bend rezoning — massive developer windfalls
Fishermans Bend was rezoned from industrial to mixed-use in 2012 under the previous government, creating enormous developer windfalls as property values increased by billions overnight. The Andrews/Allan government continued the development without adequate infrastructure planning. IBAC expressed interest in the rezoning process and developer connections to government. The pattern: government decisions create massive private windfalls, lobbying connects beneficiaries to decision-makers, and transparency is minimal.
Hotel quarantine — collective cabinet responsibility abandoned
Allan was one of the most senior cabinet ministers when hotel quarantine was established and failed — leading to 801 deaths in Victoria's second wave. The Coate inquiry could not determine who made the decision to use private security instead of ADF personnel. Andrews said he 'didn't recall'. Only Mikakos resigned. Allan continued as Transport Infrastructure Minister and later became Premier. The principle of collective cabinet responsibility — that all cabinet members share accountability for cabinet decisions — was simply abandoned.
Systematic FOI blocking on Big Build project costs
Systematic blocking and heavy redaction of FOI requests on Big Build project costs. Information routinely classified as 'commercial-in-confidence' to avoid disclosure. The Victorian Ombudsman and Parliamentary Budget Office have both flagged transparency concerns. VAGO has noted that project cost reporting lacks detail. These projects are funded entirely by Victorian taxpayers. The refusal to disclose cost details to those same taxpayers is a failure of the most basic accountability.
North East Link forced property acquisitions for 135% cost blowout project
Hundreds of properties were compulsorily acquired for the North East Link project. Owners were forced to sell. Communities were displaced. The project they were displaced for then blew out 135% — from $11.1B to $26.1B. If the government had been honest about the true cost from the start, the entire project may have been questioned. Instead, properties were acquired based on understated cost estimates.
Spouse appointed to VFA Board while serving as Premier
Yorick Piper serves on the Victorian Fisheries Authority Board — a government statutory authority — while his spouse Jacinta Allan is Premier of Victoria. Board appointments to statutory authorities are made by the responsible minister, raising questions about the independence of the appointment process. Pattern: government insider → union official → government board member. The appointment provides both income (~$40K p.a.) and institutional influence.
COVID construction exemptions benefiting CFMEU/Big Build
During COVID lockdowns, the construction industry received exemptions to continue operating while other industries were forced to close. Allan's Big Build projects — dominated by CFMEU labour — continued, while small businesses in her own electorate and across Victoria were shut down. The construction exemptions disproportionately benefited: - CFMEU members (continued employment and industrial leverage) - Big Build contractors (project continuity) - Allan's portfolio KPIs (project delivery timelines) Conflict: minister responsible for projects that benefited from exemptions she helped decide, while her spouse was a CFMEU official.
Chinese state-owned CCCC building critical Victorian infrastructure
John Holland is wholly owned by CCCC — a Chinese state-owned enterprise sanctioned by the United States for militarising artificial islands in the South China Sea. Under Allan's portfolio oversight, CCCC's subsidiary was awarded major contracts for West Gate Tunnel and Level Crossing Removals — critical transport infrastructure. No public disclosure of what security vetting was conducted. A foreign state-owned enterprise with detailed knowledge of Victorian critical infrastructure tunnels, rail systems, and transport networks. National security implications were either not assessed or not disclosed.
Commonwealth Games cancellation — $380M+ wasted
The Victorian government committed to hosting the 2026 Commonwealth Games across regional Victoria, then cancelled when costs spiralled from $2.6B to $7B+. Cancellation costs exceeded $380M. Regional communities were promised legacy infrastructure that was only partially delivered. The cost blowout pattern mirrors Big Build projects — initial estimates that bear no resemblance to final costs, with taxpayers bearing the risk.
Government tolerance of CFMEU conduct under Setka
Despite growing evidence of CFMEU corruption, intimidation, and cost inflation on government projects, the Andrews/Allan government maintained close working relationships with the CFMEU under John Setka's leadership. Setka was convicted of harassment (2019) and expelled from the ALP, yet the CFMEU continued to dominate Big Build worksites. The government did not act to limit CFMEU influence on its projects despite: - Setka's criminal conviction - Evidence of standover tactics on worksites - Estimates of 15% cost premium attributable to CFMEU conduct - Allan's own husband being a CFMEU official
East West Link cancellation — $1.3B in compensation
The Andrews government (with Allan as senior minister) cancelled the East West Link project and paid $1.3B in compensation to the consortium. Side letters signed before the 2014 election committed to cancellation regardless of cost. The $1.3B was dead money — no road, no infrastructure, just compensation for a political decision.
Branch stacking — the factional machine that elevates ministers to power
IBAC Operation Watts revealed industrial-scale branch stacking in the Victorian ALP. Donnellan admitted to it. The system works: 1. Factional operatives pay for ALP memberships (branch stacking) 2. Stacked branches vote in preselection ballots 3. Preselections determine who enters parliament 4. MPs become ministers who oversee contracts 5. Contracts benefit connected unions and corporations 6. Unions and corporations donate to the party 7. Donations fund the factional operations Allan rose through the Socialist Left faction of the Victorian ALP. The system that elevated her is the same system found to be corrupt.
| Type | Description | Amount | Year | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Other Interest | Combined household income: Premier salary $441,439 + Piper VFA Board fees (~$40,000) + any other Piper income sources. Total estimated household income: $480,000+ p.a. | $481,439 | 2024-25 | Remuneration Tribunal; VFA (estimated) |
| Sponsored Travel | Official overseas travel as Premier/Minister including interstate and international delegations. Travel costs covered by Victorian Government and declared per ministerial travel reporting requirements. | — | 2024-25 | Department of Premier and Cabinet travel reports |
| Other Income Sources | Premier of Victoria — total remuneration package | $441,439 | 2024-25 | Victorian Independent Remuneration Tribunal |
| Real Property | Residential property interest — Bendigo region (family home). Declared on Register of Members' Interests. | — | 2024-25 | Victorian Parliament Register of Members' Interests |
| Real Property | Investment property interest declared on Register of Members' Interests. Details per the register. | — | 2024-25 | Victorian Parliament Register of Members' Interests |
| Other Interest | Spouse (Yorick Piper) — VFA Board member sitting fees. Victorian statutory authority board fees typically $30,000-$50,000 p.a. | $40,000 | 2024-25 | VFA annual report (estimated from standard board fees) |
| Gifts / Hospitality | Various gifts and hospitality declared on Register of Members' Interests including event tickets, official functions, and ministerial hospitality. Full details available via the Register. | — | 2024-25 | Victorian Parliament Register of Members' Interests |
| Other Income Sources | Minister for Transport Infrastructure — salary (pre-Premier) | $358,000 | 2022-23 | Victorian Independent Remuneration Tribunal |
| Other Income Sources | Cumulative parliamentary salary estimate — 25+ years as MP/Minister/Premier (1999-2024). Estimated total career earnings from public office: $5-7M before tax. | — | 1999-2024 | Victorian Independent Remuneration Tribunal (historical rates) |
| Connection | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Transurban Group | Business Connection | As Transport Infrastructure Minister, Allan oversaw the government's relationship with Transurban on the West Gate Tunnel — a project born from Transurban's unsolicited proposal accepted without competitive tender. The CityLink concession extension (worth $8-10B+) was granted under her portfolio watch. |
| John Holland Group / CCCC | Business Connection | John Holland (CCCC subsidiary) is a major contractor on Big Build projects approved and overseen by Allan as Transport Infrastructure Minister. Chinese state-owned company on critical Victorian infrastructure. |
| CPB Contractors (CIMIC Group) | Business Connection | CPB Contractors is a major contractor on West Gate Tunnel (JV with John Holland) and North East Link packages — all projects under Allan's portfolio oversight as Transport Infrastructure Minister. |
| Ben Davis | Former Spouse | Former spouse of Jacinta Allan. |
| Daniel Andrews | Faction / Ally | Both members of the Socialist Left faction of the Victorian ALP. Allan was Andrews' most senior minister and the architect of the Big Build infrastructure program. She succeeded him as Premier and continued his policy agenda. Their political partnership spans … |
| Luke Donnellan | Faction / Ally | Both Labor caucus members. Donnellan admitted to branch stacking — the factional patronage system that controls ALP preselections and ministerial appointments. Allan rose through the same system. |
| Tim Pallas | Faction / Ally | Both Socialist Left faction. Co-architects of the Big Build fiscal strategy. Pallas signed off on every budget allocation Allan requested for transport infrastructure. Together they managed Victoria's debt from $19B to $150.9B. |
| Gavin Jennings | Faction / Ally | Both Socialist Left faction. Jennings designed the machinery of government that created Big Build agencies (MTIA, SRLA, LXRP) outside normal VPS accountability — the very agencies that Allan used to deliver her portfolio projects with minimal public service scrutiny. |
| Jenny Mikakos | Other | Cabinet colleagues. Both senior ministers during hotel quarantine failures (801 deaths). Mikakos resigned; Allan did not. Mikakos publicly accused Andrews of misleading the inquiry — raising questions about collective cabinet responsibility and who knew what. |
| Tim Pallas | Other | Cross-factional cabinet partnership: Allan (Socialist Left) and Pallas (Right/Labor Unity). Despite different factions, they were co-architects of the Big Build fiscal strategy. Pallas signed off on every budget allocation Allan requested for transport infrastructure. Together they managed Victoria's debt from … |
| Kevin Devlin | Other | Devlin as MTIA CEO reported directly to Allan as Transport Infrastructure Minister. His $800K-1M+ salary was set under arrangements Allan's government created outside normal VPS. |
| Frankie Carroll | Other | Carroll as SRLA CEO reports directly to Allan as Premier. The SRLA was created under Allan's government to deliver the $35B+ SRL — a project with no published full business case. |
| Yorick Piper | Spouse | Married 2012. Piper's career — ministerial advisor → CFMEU official → VFA Board member — tracks alongside Allan's rise through transport and infrastructure portfolios to Premier. His CFMEU role during her time as Transport Infrastructure Minister is the most significant … |
| John Setka | Union Connection | Indirect connection via CFMEU. Setka was CFMEU Victoria Secretary during the Big Build program while Allan was Transport Infrastructure Minister. Allan's spouse Yorick Piper was a CFMEU official under Setka. The CFMEU was the dominant construction union on Big Build … |
| Luba Grigorovitch | Union Connection | The RTBU under Grigorovitch has significant influence over Big Build rail projects including the Metro Tunnel, Level Crossing Removals, and Suburban Rail Loop. Union involvement in operational and industrial arrangements for these projects intersects with Allan's portfolio oversight. |